The Invisible Armada

The overlooked factors shaping the construction of China as “enemy”: 

cultural privilege, whataboutism, and disinformation on disinformation

Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado


Lecture given at Charles University of Prague

As this is a Master’s course focusing on Media and Area Studies, I assume you have a good grasp of the challenges related to maintaining objectivity in journalism and the complexities of colonial knowledge production. Consequently, the aim of this lecture is to examine how these fundamental concepts relate to a specific case: their impact on our perception of China as an external “enemy” and how they contribute to shaping this perception through communication.

We have to think about the climate we breathe today in the journalistic and academic fields with regards to China, and the elements that make it possible. In most liberal democracies in the world today we have recently experienced a rise of populism, polarisation, and antagonistic politics. We have dozens upon dozens of media outlets, both traditional and alternative, mainstream and counter-hegemonic, each of them placed in different points along the ideological spectrum. What for one media is a fantastic policy decision taken by a certain politician, other opposed media will harshly criticise it as the end of democracy, economic progress, or the unity of the nation. Put differently, the polarisation of our societies goes hand in hand with a pluralism that grants the inclusion of all voices no matter how radically opposed they are. Regardless of a politician’s shortcomings, there will invariably be a media outlet that supports their actions and, often, even their outright lies (think about Trump and Fox or Breibart “News”). 

But this diversity of perspectives within our societies does not extend to news about China, where the coverage is generally either negative or exceedingly negative. Chinese perspectives are rarely reproduced, and if they are introduced, their statements are generally presented in a subordinate position to mainstream (Western) perspectives, doubted as “propaganda” or spurned as “Chinese talking points”, pre-emptively rejecting whatever plausibility or rationality they might posses. In other words, our democratic pluralism primarily operates internally but not in relation to this external antagonist. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and “China” have become the elected “common enemy”, the “nodal point” that makes an internally divided “us” to be united in our heterogeneity. 

The crystallisation of myths—such as the democracy versus autocracy one taking place in the “Global North” today—is reminiscent of the “Myth of America” that during the “Cold War” led the US to envisage itself as a “manly, racially superior, and providentially destined ‘beacon of liberty’, a country which possesses a special right to exert power in the world”, while constructing the antagonistic myth of the “red threat” (Hixson, 2008). In this vein, approaches to China as an object of study are often burdened by “analytical frameworks which utilize essentialist Western truths to address infinitely more complex global geopolitical issues” (Peters, Green, Mou, Hollings, Ogunniran & Rizvi, 2020, p. 7). The “New Cold War” imaginaries move us to think about China as the perfect villain: China acts as it does simply because it is, inherently, an evil communist regime. Obviously, it is not an easy task to emphasize with those actors we dislike, but in pursuit of meaningful political analyses, we must refrain from automatically invalidating an argument simply because it comes from an actor we consider an “evil enemy”.

The inclination toward uniformity in dominant discourses about China gives rise to significant questions. How does the privileged position of the discourses of the “Global North” affect our evaluation of what “China” is? How can we be certain that our analysis of China remains objective when we are embedded within a narrative that repeatedly reinforces the same conclusions about the country, offering little space for critical thinking, contextualisation, and self-reflection? How much self-censorship do we practice, whether consciously or not, to conform to the expectations of our peers and superiors, especially when failing to do so arouses suspicion and higher scrutiny?

I will now delve into three essential factors that would assist us in addressing these questions: 1) the privilege of the “Global North” in the cultural and academic domains and its impact on Area Studies; 2) the de-contextualization of discourses about China through accusations of whataboutism; and 3) the emergence of disinformation on Chinese disinformation.

1) Global North’s privilege in the cultural field and Area Studies

The privilege of the “Global North” in the cultural sphere, arising from historical advantages that persist in shaping global culture today, operates as an invisible force influencing our worldview. On the one hand, through tools of soft power such as cinema, music, literature, sports or news media, the dominant societies tend to be idealised while the “Other” is unconsciously normalized as different, inferior, or even dangerous. On the other hand, these structural advantages exert sufficient influence to convince individuals within marginalized communities to support the supremacy of the “Global North” and internalize their own subjugation (Pease, 2010, p. 5). 

Given that most people in the “West” have limited direct experience with China—and that China has limited soft power to effectively communicate its viewpoints to us, let alone persuade us—our perception of the country is unavoidably shaped by these cultural mechanisms, leaving us prone to cognitive bias. Since the inception of the “China threat” narrative, and according to Denny Roy (1996, p. 758), the “alarmist edge of much of this commentary was based (sometimes explicitly, sometimes not) on antipathy toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime”. Cultural creators embedded in the hegemonic anti-China imaginary of the “Global North” consciously or unconsciously contribute to the hyped construction of the evil “enemy” and the normative assumptions of what China is. For instance, contemporary narratives in Western cultural production widely portray the country as “China the thief” and “China the manipulator” (Yuan & Fu, 2020, p. 30). 

Similarly, most “Western” journalists, no matter how hard they try to attain objectivity, are still deeply embedded in a hegemonic imaginary where the West is the best, even after living for many years in China (Plate, 2023). Chinese viewpoints are commonly judged as sheer nationalistic propaganda in toto, part of China’s “cognitive war”, aprioristically dismissing any possible elements of veracity in their claims—while suggesting that “our side” sticks to the “truth” and does not engage in propaganda or participate in cognitive warfare. This complicates the veracity of information, as mainstream media tends to only give credibility to anti-CCP and pro-Western sources without questioning their legitimacy, while alternative sources are automatically dismissed as lacking objectivity without even considering their arguments (Ruiz Casado, 2023a). 

As a subset of culture, privilege in the academic field deserves a separate mention. Bob Pease’s work criticises North American scholars in the field of privilege studies for not naming and interrogating their own privilege emanating “from living in one of the most powerful, developed and affluent countries in the world” (2010, p. 40). For instance, English being the hegemonic language in academia is a form of privilege that bestows advantages upon the scholars from some countries (and therefore their viewpoints) simply by virtue of birth, while simultaneously limiting the visibility and opportunities of non-English speakers. Those who have the financial means to receive additional English training or attend schools perceived as more prestigious also enjoy unearned advantages in the academia. This implies that the bulk of academic publications come from particularly privileged groups, shaping knowledge production with a bias from its inception, consciously or unconsciously reproducing relations of domination/oppression (see Nair, 2022, pp. 83-96; Pease, 2010, pp. 51, 58-59). 

Research has shown that the impact of privilege in academic inquiry is apparent in both the researcher’s “assumptions and narratives” used to interpret their field experiences, as well as in the relationship established between the researcher and their object of study (McCorkel & Myers, 2003). Pease similarly argues that “western social sciences are so embedded within Eurocentric assumptions that most social scientists are unaware of their European bias” (2020, p. 43). The tendency towards biased judgments can be particularly damaging when examining topics that touch upon the researcher’s own privileges, and where the researcher may have a vested interest in obtaining a particular outcome (McCorkel & Myers, 2003, p. 226). As a way of illustration, a study by Hermann Kurthen (2020, p. 1) demonstrated that no matter the ideological leaning of the 37 US foreign policy experts he interviewed, all of them coincided in the imperative of “safeguarding US global leadership, maintaining alliances, securing US prosperity, orienting at values, and believing in a mission”. In this vein, Pan (2004) critiques “China scholars” in the “West” and their supposed neutrality in studying the country, as well as their dichotomous normative assumptions about China and the US.

The academic system, the experts, and the knowledge are all infused by the partisan worldview of the dominant group, which in turn grants it both a privileged position and legitimacy. Even the institutions of education in countries of the “Global South” have largely originated with the support of universities in the “Global North” or experts educated in them. Hence, the deeply ingrained theses of the “Global North” within the academia lead many scholars to aprioristically neglect and dismiss the arguments of the “Other”. The consequences of the global privileges in culture enjoyed by the “Global North” is a widespread absence of self-reflection on their entitlements and the inequalities between the “Global North” and the “Global South”, or between the US and China. In sum, the cultural advantage held by the “Global North” shapes the prevailing narrative, rationalizes “our” behaviours, and normalises “our” dominant position, all the while dismissing the grievances of the “Other” and considering their subordination as the natural order of things.

Furthermore, it is often ignored how scholars that go against the hegemonic understanding of China also encounter barriers and pressure in the “Global North”. First, in the existing environment of anti-China hostility, it becomes possible that scholars showing equidistance or defending certain Chinese perspectives become stigmatised by peers as siding with the “enemy”, in a logic that curtails pluralism and induces self-censorship. A second point is that scholars who challenge the prevailing view of the “China threat” may encounter unfair obstacles in getting their work published, not necessarily because of lack of merit but rather because their arguments contradict the entrenched imaginaries of editors and reviewers.

In a recent book, Jon Solomon (2023) investigates how the field of area studies, created at US universities during a specific historical context of ideological struggle (the Cold War), has participated in the geopolitical tactics and strategies of the US in its quest for unipolarity and global hegemony. Area studies established the methodologies, protocols, language, structures, and expectations that practitioners in the field adhere to in their pursuit of validation from their peers. Importantly, it has certain colonial epistemologies embedded, a sense or “direction of inquiry” importantly impregnated by orientalism, which elevates the views from the “West” to the range of “universal truth” while dismissing those of “the Rest” (Solomon, 2023). Accordingly, area studies not merely produce “objective knowledge”, but also performatively construct what we understand as “common sense”. 

The academic privilege of the “Global North” thus hinders the de-colonisation of knowledge, normalises existing relations of domination/subordination, and legitimates the “China threat” rhetoric through scholarly work. It is crucial to increase the awareness and self-critique about our own positionality as part of the ideological state apparatus (as Althusser would put it), intentionally or unintentionally legitimating structures of inequality and reinforcing narratives that seek to sustain a system of (global) privileges.

2) What the critique of “whataboutism” hides: presentism and essentialism

Included in the rationale guiding this MA course, there is an affirmation which mere existence speaks volumes about the problems we are discussing here. It reads: “Regions are not internally homogeneous, and they cannot be studied in isolation”. The inclusion of such an apparently obvious statement in the introductory rationale of a postgraduate degree underscores the dangerous influence of dominant narratives in encouraging stereotypes and discouraging critical thought about the “Other”, even among highly educated individuals. In this context, a keyword that has gained momentum in current narratives to stifle richer perspectives that advocate the importance of studying China within a broader context, is the term “whataboutism”. I define the critique of whataboutism as a presentist and essentialist discursive tactic that seeks to neglect calls for contextualisation and self-reflection by claiming that this equates siding with the “enemy”. 

For example, in instances where the US accuses China of harbouring imperialist intentions toward Taiwan, there are often voices that raise the question of “what about” considering also (or instead) the US’s neo-imperialist actions that contributed to the original separation of Taiwan from the mainland and are still in force today. Recently, in reaction to the G7’s criticism of China’s economic coercion, many observers and Chinese media have pointed out that the US has historically practiced economic coercion by imposing sanctions on perceived adversaries, including China, as seen in recent trade and chip “wars” (e.g. Economic coercion, 2023). These counter-arguments are subsequently labelled as engaging in whataboutism and are accused of being co-opted by the CCP or being apologists for China’s actions, shutting down debate (see Franceschini & Loubere, 2020, p. 20). Thus, the employment of whataboutism as a pejorative catchword to silence contextualisation steers us toward a viewpoint that prioritizes the present, ignoring or dismissing the relevance of past events to comprehensively understand current developments. 

Moreover, those who use whataboutism as a weapon often take an essentialist stance that normatively categorizes the actions of “democracies” as forgivable or as inherently less harmful than similar actions undertaken by “authoritarian” regimes. However, this normative falsity would presuppose that coercion by democracies would be legitimate because their intrinsic objectives are inherently laudable. Or presuppose that democracies can act in the international arena anti-democratically and with total impunity just because they are democratic at home. Crucially, the dominant narrative today represents the actions of the “Global North”, such as the defence of Taiwan against China, as supporting freedom and democracy vis-à-vis oppression and autocracy. But this oversimplifying, Manichean narrative ignores, for instance, that Taiwan originally began to be supported when it operated as a proto-fascist anti-communist dictatorship. It also fails to acknowledge that the period of the most peaceful relations between China and Taiwan coincided with the democratic tenure of the Ma administration from 2008 to 2016. Furthermore, it overlooks how the US might be a liberal democracy at home but has often acted anti-democratically in the international arena.

When we compare Chinese actions to those of the US, it is not merely about exposing analogous actions to justify the actions of the former. Two wrongs do not make a right. While it is indeed a problem that whataboutism sometimes elevates absurd comparisons to diminish the severity of China’s actions, we cannot ignore how the critique of whataboutism is a tool to reject contextualisation and free privileged actors to redirect the narrative to advances their interests. Two aspects must be considered. The first one is that instead of recognising that all sides have committed faults against the international order, the hegemonic narrative and social imaginaries in the “Global North” today univocally establish China as the only threat to the “rules-based international order”—a notion distinct from “international law”. We need to be aware that criticism of China does not take place just for the sake of justice and human rights, but also to a greater or lesser degree with the goal of demonising a challenger while whitewashing the past and present actions of those who claim the moral ground. The US, through its actions, has established a hierarchical global order that affords it certain systemic advantages, while placing other countries, like China, at a disadvantage—for example, in terms of discourse.


The second is that wrongful actions committed by the US cannot be equated with similar ones by China in terms of its ethical and political significance. China indeed engages in shameful economic coercion and has abused its power to illegally attain territory—for example by occupying islands and creating artificial ones in the South China Sea. But if liberal democracies, particularly the US, self-appoint themselves as the defenders of the “rules-based international order” and the leaders of the “free world”, they should lead by example and do not engage in analogous acts (e.g. military bases imposed on islands such as Diego García, Okinawa, Guam, Cuba’s Guantánamo, etc.; meddling in the Chinese Civil War and instrumentalising international law to keep Taiwan separated for geostrategic convenience; illegal invasions of sovereign countries such as Iraq…). If the leader of the international order is not setting an example, how could we expect others to do so? In other words, given the role the US plays, its wrongdoings have deeper implications than those of China. 

3) Disinformation on disinformation

A final point I wish to highlight is the presence of disinformation regarding purported disinformation originating from China. This phenomenon underscores that disinformation efforts are not one-sided and can also emanate from the “Global North”, not exclusively from China. For instance, in the book chapter “Taiwan as a Field for Disinformation” (Ruiz Casado, 2023b), I analysed how the statements about the Chinese “incursions” on the Taiwanese Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) prevalent in international (Western) media are largely hyped and misleading, when not false, ignoring the lack of international legality of ADIZ zones or often talking about “national airspace” instead, which it is not. 

Now I would like to analyse a recent article by The Economist titled China is flooding Taiwan with disinformation (2023). The article starts with a case defined by The Economist as “likely Chinese disinformation”, based on a news piece shared by a Taiwanese media. The news claimed that some purported leaked minutes of a meeting showed that the US had asked Taiwan to develop biological weapons in a new biosafety level 4 lab. However, while it seems a clear case of disinformation, we do not know its exact origin, either from China or Taiwan. Indeed, later the article points out that “more than half [of the anti-US/anti-DPP alleged disinformation] appeared to have Taiwanese origins”. In any case, this initial case of disinformation serves as the foundation to create a state of opinion for the rest of the article, where The Economist makes an unsubstantiated assertion that mere dissent or counter-hegemonic political opinions are disinformation. This becomes evident in the subsequent examples of alleged Chinese disinformation that are introduced, rather pejoratively, under the label “US scepticism”.

First, The Economist claims that both the main Taiwanese opposition party (the KMT) and “Chinese state actors” (implicitly constructing them as partners or equals) endorse a narrative of the conflict that portrays the US and the party governing Taiwan (the DPP) as the primary contributors to the risk of war in the Taiwan Strait. This is unambiguously defined in the article as a “false message”. However, this cannot be deemed disinformation or “fake news” but just a (political) opinion, an interpretation of existing facts with which we can agree or disagree. For instance, one could contend that the period characterized by fewer military or diplomatic confrontations between China and Taiwan coincided with the government of the KMT from 2008 to 2016, and it was the arrival of the DPP to power in Taiwan (in 2016) and of Trump to the White House (in 2017) that significantly initiated a shift in the dynamics (e.g. see Hickey, 2023). China is not the only factor to consider, and responsibilities for the increase in tensions are at least shared. 

Furthermore, being sceptical of the reasons for US support of Taiwan is not synonymous with endorsing conspiracy theories or disinformation. It involves recognizing the historical background of the conflict: since 1949, when the US-allied KMT regime sought refuge in Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War against the CCP, the US has aimed to maintain the island as an anti-communist stronghold. Dismissing this historical context and labelling as disinformation the legitimate idea that the US might have self-serving geostrategic interests in supporting a separate Taiwan, in order to contain China (which could lead to war, or rather the continuation of the never officially ended Chinese Civil War), is itself a form of disinformation. This narrative approach, enacted clearly by The Economist but largely prevalent in the “Global North” more broadly, blurs the line between dissent and disinformation, while presenting their partisan viewpoint as an “absolute truth” instead.

We can see this clearer when The Economist mentions a particular example of “US scepticism” disinformation presented through the account of an expert on Chinese disinformation (note my emphasis in italics): 

She points to a spurious claim that America “wants to blow up” TSMC, a Taiwanese chipmaker. It originated with a misleading video posted on Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok, which featured an American lawmaker appearing to discuss the possibility. The following morning, a Taiwanese newspaper published a story about the video. Opposition lawmakers and talk-show hosts whipped up outrage. “The journey from China’s Douyin to Taiwan’s mass media, videos, newspapers and television took less than half a day,” says Ms Chien. 

Paradoxically, that statement about purported Chinese disinformation is in itself disinformation for several reasons. For instance, the comments of this US lawmaker, Congressman Seth Moulton, circulated widely throughout Twitter and in Western media, not just on China and Taiwan as the article makes us believe. Moreover, this US lawmaker did not “appear” to discuss the possibility of blowing up the chip manufacturer TSMC, he unambiguously did so. Moulton was discussing ideas as to “how to convey to the CCP the enormous costs they would incur if they choose to invade Taiwan”, during a panel discussion hosted by a California-headquartered institute (Remarks, 2023). At one point, Moulton suggested:

one of the interesting ideas that’s floated out there for deterrence is just making it very clear to the Chinese, that if you invade Taiwan, we’re gonna blow up TSMC. I just throw that out, not because that’s necessarily the best strategy, but because it’s an example. […] Of course, the Taiwanese really don’t like this idea (ibid.). 

After being criticised for voicing this idea, Moulton defended himself confessing that “I’m not promoting the idea. […] What I’m saying is these are some of the things that are actually actively being debated amongst US policymakers” (Remarks, 2023). His acknowledgment that there is an ongoing “active” debate on this matter underscores that it is not misinformation to draw attention to the fact that many influential individuals within the highest levels of US foreign policy do not see Taiwan as a partner, but rather as a potentially expendable tool for containing China. As Van Jackson (2023) points out: “I would ignore Moulton’s comments as a deranged gaffe except that other policy people who serve the MAGA agenda are endorsing the statement”. As a matter of fact, Moulton has a crucial role in US foreign policy as one of the Democratic Party’s leading voices on defence, and is a member of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. 

Furthermore, Moulton was neither the first nor the last one to share this view. For example, two US scholars recommended the same approach in a paper published by the US Army War College in 2021 (McKinney & Harris, 2021). As well, Trump’s National Security Adviser, Robert O’Brien, claimed in March this year that the US is “never going to let those factories fall into Chinese hands” and that they should destroy chip fabs in the same way the UK “ordered the destruction of France’s naval fleet during World War II after France surrendered to Germany” (Nguyen, 2023). Similarly, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development during the Trump administration, Elbridge Colby (2023), equally supported on May 6 the declaration of Congressman Moulton and rejected the idea that it was for Taiwanese to decide what to do with TSMC in case of a Chinese invasion: “Sorry but that’s not just a Taiwanese decision. Far too important for the rest of us”, he claimed. 

Some of these politicians, advisors, and experts will potentially be part of a future Republican administration in 2025. Worryingly, Congressman Moulton is a Democrat and not a Republican, a fact that raises fears that this approach towards China-Taiwan is not a minority strategy but a bipartisan consensus. On May 12, an article in the Washington Post analyzed Molton’s statements and argued that “It’s hard to imagine that a White House on the cusp of losing Taiwan wouldn’t think about how to ensure that dual-use technology worth far more doesn’t fall into the hands of a great-power rival” (Willick, 2023). Are we to assume that he and the Washington Post were also spreading disinformation? 

To deflect the blame onto China by using keywords such as “Chinese disinformation” or “China’s cognitive warfare” as a means to cover contentious statements made by a US legislator is also a form of spreading disinformation. China has become the elected scapegoat when situations take a negative turn and when there is a desire to evade responsibility or silence critics. As way of illustration, when former secretary of state Mike Pompeo was asked by the BBC about how the 2021 Capitol insurrection had affected US global image, he responded: “I actually think that question is basically Chinese propaganda” (as cited in Jackson, 2022, p. 205). Indeed, for Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, “a careful examination of the US lawmaker’s comments would point to the fact that those reports had fallen prey to ‘China’s cognitive warfare’ against Taiwan” (Remarks, 2023).

What are the effects of these authoritative statements on scholars? In my case, at that time the Taiwanese Foreign Minister accused those worried about Moulton declarations as “preys” of Chinese disinformation, I was an employee of Academia Sinica, the main public research institution in Taiwan. I harboured concerns about how my peers would react to my views and worried about the potential impact on my career prospects in the country. I must admit that I experienced self-censorship, fearing that I might be labelled a potential “collaborator” should I choose to swim against the current.

Within Taiwan, the accusation of being a “collaborator” is often explicit: “Taiwanese officials believe that many of the Taiwanese launching US-scepticism untruths are ‘local collaborators’ taking orders and payments from China”, the article in The Economist claims without any condemnation of the Taiwanese government, ignoring the dangers of such strategy of witch-hunting. Those who advocate for an alternative (peaceful) solution to the Taiwan conflict that differs from the current strategy, which leans on military escalation and what is referred to as “deterrence” with the backing of the US, are frequently subjected to harsh stigmatization. They are commonly accused of being pro-Chinese, labelled as traitors to their nation, or simply dismissed as disseminators of disinformation in alignment with Beijing. This labelling aims to diminish their ability to challenge prevailing narratives and question the confrontational stance adopted by the Taiwanese and US governments since 2017. 

Conclusive remarks

In sum, the Asian “giant” has become constructed as a common “threat” in a dangerously homogeneous Schimittian (friend-enemy) understanding of the world. This leaves few voices daring to counter such narrative. Of course, it is not to suggest that it is our obligation to blindly support China, but rather to sound an alarm against a resurgence of McCarthyism and the emergence of a “New Cold War” atmosphere that is swiftly encircling us. This creates conditions for hostile polarization against an external adversary to flourish while remaining fundamentally unchecked, thereby distorting our perception of the “truth” as a society. 


China is flooding Taiwan with disinformation (2023, September 26). The Economist. 

Colby, E. [@ElbridgeColby]. (2023, May 6). Sorry but that’s not just a Taiwanese decision. Far too important for the rest of us [Tweet]. X.  

Economic coercion as American as apple pie (2023, May 17). China Daily. 

Franceschini, I., & Loubere, N. (2020). What about Whataboutism? Viral Loads and Hyperactive Immune Responses in the China Debate. Made in China.

Hickey, D. V. (2023, March 30). Tsai Ing-wen Must Share the Blame for the Deterioration of Cross-Strait Relations. The Diplomat.

Hixson, W. L. (2008). The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Jackson, V. (2023, May 6). Blow Up TSMC? How Washington’s 'Deterrence' Talk Sacrifices Taiwan. Un-Diplomatic. 

McCorkel, J. A., & Myers, K. (2003). What Difference Does Difference Make? Position and Privilege in the Field. Qualitative Sociology, 26(2), 199-231.

McKinney, J. M., & Harris, P. (2021). Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan. Parameters, 51(4), 23-36.

Nair, C. (2022). Dismantling Global White Privilege Equity for a Post-Western World. Oakland CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers.

Nguyen, B. (2023, March 15). US would destroy Taiwan’s semiconductor factories rather than letting them fall into China's hands, a former national security advisor says. Business Insider. 

Pan, C. (2004). The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of other as Power Politics. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 29(3), 305–31

Pease, B. (2010). Undoing privilege: unearned advantage in a divided world. London: Zed Books.

Peters, M.A., Green, B., Mou, C., Hollings, S., Ogunniran, M.L., Rizvi, F., Rider, S., & Tierney, R. (2020). US–China Rivalry and ‘Thucydides’ Trap’: Why this is a misleading account. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 

Plate, T. (2023, April 5). US pandemic of dogmatism about China must end before it leads to war. SCMP.

Remarks about blowing up TSMC ‘selectively clipped’: U.S. Rep. Moulton (2023, May 11). Focus Taiwan.

Roy, D. (1996). The ‘China Threat’ Issue: Major Arguments. Asian Survey, 36(8), 758-771.

Ruiz Casado, J. A. (2023a). The Case of Guo Wengui: How Anti-China ‘Fake News’ Thrives in the West. The Diplomat.

Ruiz Casado, J. A. (2023b). Taiwan as a Field for Disinformation. In Brossat, A., and Ruiz Casado, J. A. (2023). Culture of Enmity: The Discursive Struggle for Taiwan in the making of the New Cold War. Singapore: Springer. 

Ruiz Casado, J. A. (2024, forthcoming). The intersectionalities of global privilege and the construction of the “China threat”. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs.

Solomon, J. (2023). The Taiwan Consensus and the Ethos of Area Studies in Pax Americana: Spectral Transitions. Singapore: Springer.

Willick, J. (2023, May 12). Blow up the microchips? What a Taiwan spat says about U.S. strategy. The Washington Post. 

Yuan, Z.-Q., & Fu, Q. (2020). Narrative Framing and the United States’ Threat Construction of Rivals. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 13(3), 419-453.