The Invisible Armada


The metamorphoses of genocide

By Alain Brossat

種族滅絕變形記 (Chinese version)

各個世界悄然交鋒,大動干戈的欲望愈來愈藏不住,有些文字就在這個脈胳裡漸漸變成武器。文字要拿來做武器,先要加工一番,變得適合在戰場上運用才行。一眾新冷戰工程師和僱傭兵狂熱萬分,為此不遺餘力,很快就在這方面獲得專家級知識。

這個新格局其中一個關鍵詞,我們也寫了出來,那就是「種族滅絕」。在逐漸成形的論述戰裡,這個詞牽涉的事重要無比,既關乎政治又關乎哲學,好值得我們花力氣談一談,畢竟這些事每天都在注入養分,讓大家重新運用起「種族滅絕」這個詞來,一門虛無而頑固無比的種族滅絕修辭也就泛濫起來。

四月廿二號,有一班屈指可數的英國國會議員(不清楚有五位還是七位,無論如何也不夠十位,而這個龐大國會總共有六百五十位議員),耍程序把戲通過了一項議案,把中國政權在新彊「再教育」維吾爾人口的這波政治攻勢稱為種族滅絕,是違反人類利益的罪行。

這項議案一點司法價值也沒有,對英國政府完全沒有約束效用,所以只不過是寥寥無幾的政客在賣語意模糊的廣告,其他地方(特別是在美國)已經有類似的舉動,這次輪到他們接棒。這就像很多其他議案一樣,旨在讓人覺得把這波政治攻勢(包括囚禁大量人口,還有其他千夫所指的行為)命名為種族滅絕實在平常不過,甚至是無法可依時的大道理。然而就在議案通過前幾個禮拜,美國國務院司法顧問團隊交出了正式報告,表示儘管中國高層在新彊的某些行為(如強制勞動)應該可以界定為違反人類利益的罪行也好,都並不存在足夠證據把這些政策稱為種族滅絕。

這班英國國會反中說客大耍把戲,在英國被稱為「鬧劇」,兩日後卻變成《台北時報》的「breaking news」,篇幅還佔了六個欄位:「UK lawmakers call PRC’s Uyghur policies ’genocide’」。標題深思熟慮,分明扭曲事實,因為這個說法就會讓讀者以為是國會大多數議員通過了議案。內文沒有一處提到投票贊成議案的人其實少得不值一晒。不是只在泛濫成災的社交媒體上才有fake news散播的。

相反,那篇文章提到其中一個提出議案的人,那個人叫做甘妮[1],在新彊議題上反中很久,也因此遭中國政府制裁,她說的話就讓這一下粗製濫造的政治宣傳有趣起來了;甘妮就趁這次機會武斷地重新定義甚麼是種族滅絕,完全讓這個概念走偏了:「There is a misunderstanding that genocide is just one act — mass killing. That is false.[2]」還說一切在新彊昭然若揭,有人打算把一個(國族、種族、宗教)群體完全摧毀又或破壞一部分,符合種族滅絕的行為全都有了……

這班人大可以應徵語言宗師一職,唯我獨尊,全世界的政治哲學課本和字典也要亦步亦趨,換句話說,按照他們的說法,「種族滅絕」一詞一定要整個重新演繹,移到別處去,並擴展起來。從此,要令一個人類群體(不論用種族、宗教還是國藉來界定也好)從地上消失的這個意圖完全就淪為次要了。把一個群體消滅(而這就假定要有規律去做),這個種族滅絕的核心想法,那名英國說客就換成隨意可變的標準,由她「to destroy in whole or in part」一說可見一斑,也因此有了「文化種族滅絕」這個同樣隨意可變的概念。

這樣稀釋了種族滅絕,結果就是哪一個少數群體也好,只要覺得某個國家、某個政權,又或另一個群體實行某些政策,而自己受歧視逼害,就有資格說別人打算拆散自己的群體,抹去自己的身分,消除自己獨特之處,自己遭「文化種族滅絕」;一有關乎語言、宗教、風俗的歧視,就假定是潛在的種族滅絕:在法國和印度對穆斯林的強烈歧視一定就是種族滅絕了;在西班牙也一樣吧,加泰隆尼亞人認為自己受到國家粗暴對待。在台灣也是呢,原住民的語言和習俗一直不太受認同。還有反過來說,當那些極度支持獨立的人說台灣要「去中國化」的時候,也一樣散發出強烈的種族滅絕氣味……

這樣一來,種族滅絕就變了通行證,一旦有人身為少數群體,受到不公對待,要向比他們更有權勢的人討回公道就可以用。種族滅絕這個概念成為參與這項稀釋工序的人心目中最強武器,用來對付敵人,就失去原本的意涵,而敵人現在就是指中國勢力了。

一九四四年,林清[3]鑄造這個概念主要有兩個目標:為史無前例的罪行弄出一個名字來。種族滅絕是個造出來的詞,混合了希臘和拉丁字根,這並非偶然:就是要在某程度上的緊急狀態裡造出新詞來指稱一宗集體罪行(納粹犯下的種族屠殺),而那時候,我指在蘇聯軍隊解放集中營這個歷史分水嶺,以前任何國家犯下的罪行似乎也不能和這一宗相提並論,所以既有詞彙裡並沒有合適的字眼來指稱:血洗、殺戮、屠宰、集體逼害……甚至是趕盡殺絕,似乎也不足以形容這宗罪行,既呈現不到納粹犯下這宗罪行是有多麼故意(有系統、有全盤計劃),也涵蓋不到受害者怎樣遭罪犯國家用唯我獨尊又種族歧視的意識形態來標記。

林清這位司法學家造出種族滅絕這個詞來,第二個目標是創造條件,讓一種足以和納粹滔天大罪匹敵的公義產生。於是,就要把某些納粹犯下的罪行當作不會過期,要用這個前提來做裁決,放棄一般會用到的原則,容許新法例追溯這些罪行。

大家就看到種族滅絕這個詞原本是造出來做甚麼的,種族滅絕是歷史和司法的範疇,和「違反全人類利益的罪行」這個概念有別,功能清清楚楚:要製造阻礙,讓大家很難把某些國家罪行、某些二十世紀的歷史罪行變得相對,而那些罪行的特點可以這樣歸納:計劃罪行並且執行的人是要把某一群人類切走,不把他們當做人類一分子,全因他們有某種血緣、某個國藉、某個社會地位,又或屬於某個種族、信奉某個宗教。在那班罪犯心中,這是一個淨化計劃,要竭力毀滅,一個也不漏,因為他們不能夠和這群人類在地球上一起居住。

種族滅絕這個概念旨在讓大家思考得到,這個在「現代」條件下實行的計劃有甚麼獨特;特別讓大家避免把現代的種族滅絕溶解在籠統的人類屠殺史裡,這種歷史模糊不清,置身時間之外,毫無概念可言,而這樣小心翼翼,就哪怕困難重重,也可以走上彌補受害者損失的漫漫長路。如果大家還想「種族滅絕」是個概念,還想把概念原本分析局勢的尖銳力量保留下來,就無論如何也不要把概念稀釋,搓圓按扁,用來投機取巧。

然而,恰恰事與願違,有人仗著有官方認證,在旁扇風點火,談起維吾爾族問題時修辭一直變本加厲。奇怪又獨特的是,今天有人把種族滅絕變得平庸,並利用起來,這股傾向發揮得無拘無束,但是我們還未真正走出另一道同樣有殺傷力的摺:用上另一套修辭把猶太大屠殺弄成某種公民宗教,目的是把納粹摧毀歐洲猶太人群體一事說成有史以來唯一的種族滅絕,奉為種族滅絕的圭皋。這個手法會叫大家舉步難行,難以把其他種族滅絕辨認出來,一一承認(譬如亞美尼亞種族滅絕),還會交織出一場受害者比拼,而只要大家把猶太大屠殺這場歐洲災難當作種族滅絕的標準,我們就會捲進這個旋渦。這個手法之所以容易用,當然也因為事實是林清這個新造詞的源起,恰恰和「終極解決辦法[4]」這宗史無前例的納粹罪行分不開。

其他種族滅絕曝光太少,不只是因為猶太大屠殺的引力強大無比,往往把種族滅絕這個詞牽引到自己的運行軌道。還是因為認為猶太大屠殺絕對是獨一無二的論述在九十年代如日方中(有些人甚至會加碼,形容為「獨一無二舉世無雙」),明確地往一門染有神學色彩的倫理學轉去,抗拒歷史討論政治批判,不想大家探討這套論述的哲學前設和意識形態。

但是,這樣看問題、這樣思考猶太滅絕獨特處,又有一抹強烈的政治神學色彩,主要是武斷地把以色列國當作神聖之物,這樣一來,以色列國就免疫,不能再受批評。按照這個說話模式,種族滅絕就和獨一無二(絕對例外)的猶太大屠殺混為一談,本身有甚麼特點就再不用理會,而猶太大屠殺就逐漸被弄成一件神聖之物,(讓人惶恐不堪)。有國家宣稱自己是受害者的繼承人,擺出負責人的模樣,說自己要替受害者伸冤,那麼就換這樣做的國家變成神聖之物了,於是大家就不可批判。

這就是上世紀最後幾十年的種族滅絕論述手法,以猶太大屠殺為中心。在定下時代調子的論述布置而言,當年的姿態和今天大家看見的有一道鴻溝,差別還愈來愈大,這一點就是今天我們要好好思考的;時移世易,種族滅絕這個強大無比的字詞又一次成為兵家爭奪之地。

剛才說的第一個機制,為求扼要,我們接下來稱為朗思曼[5]機制,重點是有一宗罪中之罪無法描繪敍說,又無法分析,大家只可以作證--有人倖存,有人目睹一切發生,有人替受害者作證,有人證,還有物證。這個做法引起的情感是憐憫,大家漸漸分不清楚哪些是追憶哪些是崇拜,所有把只此一家的種族滅絕當作史實的討論都必然殘忍,甚至可以說是智力有問題,看守記憶的人會怒不可遏口誅筆伐。但是,追憶罪中之罪,追憶到變成原教旨主義就很可疑了--有林林總總的政治潛台詞。單刀直入的話,朗思曼有一部作品歌頌以色列軍隊(《Tsahal》),大家很難把這部電影和支撐著整套猶太大屠殺神學倫理論述的電影分開來看,我指那部同名鉅著,又名《浩劫》。

過去神色凝重,語氣強而有力,用形而上的哲學論調來維護種族滅絕的話語規矩,現在新彊問題就上演論述大龍鳳,落差可真大!今天定下基調的不再是受人尊崇的哲學家(列維納斯、布朗舒、呂格爾等等[6]),而是受到可疑慈善團體資助的政界紅人、蓬佩奧式高傲[7]而盲目行事的政客、煽風點火的反中專家、制服一模一樣的記者。以前,看守記憶的人為了「猶太大屠殺獨一無二」這套論述力盡已任,若有人想辦法看出這套論述規矩有甚麼不妥、有甚麼死角,說可以有其他敍說方式,就會有機會千夫所指,沒資格再討論,正因為大家會馬上質疑那人要跟萬惡之首簽和約了[8]。

而那些「維吾爾種族滅絕」的風風雨雨,就不用費力氣佩載沉甸甸的形而上裝備了,輕盈出遊,單刀直入:找出盔甲的縫隙,把毒劍一下刺進,力求中國再站不穩。簡單來說,各個世界交鋒酣戰,這場仗愈來愈激烈,永無止境,西方這位說教者最近卻在這次2019新冠瘟疫裡發覺自己在中國前一敗塗地(我指生命政治有沒有效用這個層面),那麼西方一眾管理人就不得不裝腔作態把原有的論述重新固定好,發揚自己身負昭昭天命而一直代表的價值和光芒。這就是今次維吾爾種族滅絕集體鬼附身的最主要功能和召命了。

再說一次,分析這個論述手法(或者像大家在聖馬克思時代會說的意識形態攻勢[9]),並不等同迴避當下中國領導層新彊政策有的「問題」,這絕對也不是目的;決不是要說「走開,沒甚麼好看!」。當然就有甚麼要看了,但是這個「甚麼」,大家一定要批判分析,書寫系譜,用這個進路的平常條件來指稱,而並非虛無高舉蒙昧,狂熱追求混沌,暗地裡渴望中國政制崩潰,然後一切就如大家所料。

要看到的就是有人被逼涵化融入,平常人生活最私密的地方、文化宗教根基都受到損害,這是一種有新殖民精神風格的政治攻勢。這波「大攻勢」背後是一種「凡事都要計劃」的政治行動觀念,做法粗暴簡陋,只求有效快捷。這樣看來,在新彊的政治工程應該可以和文革時的「知識分子上山下鄉」比較,當時上百萬住在城市的青少年,主要是大學生、高中生,受差派到鄉郊過活。當時已經是為了「再教育」,青少年要受過分規訓,改造意識形態。就是要看到今天被成功沖昏頭腦的權力鐵腕,面對關乎穆斯林的「分彆」[10]問題完全無能為力,而這個分彆(也關乎每每推開又回來的殖民維度),今天已變成全球的事。

但是,把這個問題連上蘇聯時期的白色恐怖又或納粹屠殺,如同聖旨一般,絲毫參考資料、絲毫理據也沒有,就只佩戴著《一九八四》這張奧威爾萬用通行證,這可真是帶有時代調子的純粹虛無主義,(依照局勢,也由中國官僚怎樣幫倒忙可見,新彊問題嚴峻,完全還未算得上解決)。

簡直就讓一代剛剛畢業又野心勃勃的投機者進駐大學裡,整片學院生涯都舖好路了,他們所有學術資本就只有對中國的瘋狂仇恨;這班年青一輩的思想師父是蓬佩奧和曾茲[11],對有關蘇聯和納粹集中營系統的經典一概不知;還盲目相信重複做政治宣傳就有述行效用,只要竭力說有一場種族滅絕在新彊發生,和大家平常說的奧斯維辛、古拉格有同一個性質,這些咒語就會成真,變成不會生鏽的事實;就是一班冷戰博士初出茅蘆,像大家在西方國家差不多隨處也找到的三流政治家,急得跺地,專門搞反中行動,渴望中國政權針對他們,這樣也許就會碰巧有額外聲望--的確又行得通[12]。

論述有甚麼條件,話語有甚麼規矩,根本和政治問題有關,也和權力關係問題有關,當大家由這個角度來反思,就會驚訝,兩個理應互相排斥的模態竟然組合在一起;一個是以下這條常規:有些東西大家可以稱為生命力話語,會在一個既有構局裡界定「真」這個領域,界定出何為真,並會納入「不得討論」機制,於是就對所有批評免疫。當你身處以前那片論述地勢,被人指控自己「相對化猶太大屠殺」就實在是可以碰上的最壞事情,畢竟猶太大屠殺獨一無二(絕對獨特)一說在那裡穩佔上風。我剛才說的其中一個模態就是話語規矩這種不寬容、這重教義意味。

然後另一個是完美斷裂機制,和上一段的絕對真理機制短兵交接,所有前設也抵觸,就是指大家翻開新一頁,甚至把前面的全都撕掉,通通忘記,開啟新一章,需要的話更會擦掉痕跡,不過通常連這樣做也不會:大家就作罷,了無牽掛,毫不擔心。原本獨一無二的種族滅絕就變成引擎,讓政治哲學用來轉變成神學倫理;現在大家就重新運用這個詞,急急忙忙地重畫成「文化種族滅絕」(不過總是縮短成種族滅絕),犯人是中國極權政府,而今次黏住這個詞不放的是異質聯盟,有記者、政客、學院填鴨的年青一輩。當下時代股東[13]順著議程來開會,隨時開打也可以:今天最重要是contain and roll back[14]中國勢力,用盡所有手段來個炮打司令部!而跟著列維納斯學習倫理和查考經文就變得次要了……

有人可能不以為然,反正總有人會把種族滅絕這個概念當做工具來用,說得不錯,但是用到連這個詞的基本意思也不理會(二零零六年版拉魯斯詞典:「種族滅絕:有系統地把一群人類(因國族、種族、宗教緣故)趕盡殺絕」[15]),就又越過一條線了。很不幸,這樣不斷加碼、把文字污染成政治工具和戰爭武器的人高朋滿座:今年四月廿二號,拜登正式以美國之名承認亞美尼亞種族滅絕有發生過,動機並不是愛好真相,也不是渴望向受害人鄭重賠償,而簡直是可怕又庸俗的,就是主要想懲罰土耳其和艾爾多安近來干涉亞美尼亞外交、軍事政策,這些舉動並不合美國的意思。

這樣用種族滅絕,就是為了讓政治又或戰爭(戲謔一句名句好了)「用別的方法來繼續」[16],真的叫人惶恐又悲哀。

卓姆士奇[17]接受一位《紐約時報》記者訪問,說了這番話 :「就拿在維吾爾人身上發生的事來說吧。我們很難確實知道發生甚麼事,不過就有足夠資料證明那裡有人受極嚴苛壓逼。但是,容我問你一條非常簡單的問題:有上百萬維吾爾人進了所謂的教育營,這個情況比起數量是雙倍的加沙居民承受的更壞嗎?我意思是:我們有沒有一直轟炸摧毀維吾爾人的發電廠和食水設備?以我所知就沒有。所以沒錯,新彊現在的事情並不應該發生,我們一定要抗議。不過那和加沙發生的事分別很大,就是很遺憾,我們為維吾爾人做不到甚麼,相反,加沙的話,我們可以話事,而且正正要為發生的事負責,我們可以讓戰禍明天就停下來,這辦得到啊。這就是分別了。所以沒錯,世上現時有那麼多壞事,在新彊發生的事也算壞透了,不過說就是這件事在威脅我們,實在有一點誤導吧。[18]」

這番首先說給美國人聽的話,說得一點也不錯……

(布洛薩著,韓旻奇譯)

[1] (譯註)甘妮,Nus Ghani (1972-),英國保守黨現任國會議員。

[2] 「大家有誤解,以為種族滅絕只是一個行為、只是屠殺。這樣想就錯了。」

[3] (譯註)林清,Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959),猶太裔波蘭司法學家。

[4] (譯註)當時的納粹官方說法,全名為「解決猶太人問題的終極辦法」。

[5] (譯註)朗思曼,Claude Lanzmann (1925-2018),法國紀錄片導演。

[6] (譯註)三位法國哲學家,在二十世紀下半葉思考過猶太種族滅絕這個問題。

[7] (譯註)rogue,暗指政治術語「流氓國家」(rogue state)。

[8] 我當然不是在說那一小撮否認種族滅絕有發生過的狂熱教徒了--這班人的觀點徹頭徹尾虛無,是非顛倒樂此不疲,所以討論這些問題時,從來也不用考慮這個觀點。

[9] (譯註)作者出身法國,而馬克思主義六七十年代在法國蔚為風潮。

[10] (譯註)différend,其中一重意思是兩方衝突、不和、不解,卻沒有第三者能夠做仲裁。懂法語的讀者,可以參閱作者另一篇文章,Le différend culturel:https://ici-et-ailleurs.org/rencontres/article/le-differend-culturel

[11] (譯註)曾茲,Adrian Zenz (1974-),學者,自稱遵循上帝旨意來反共。非常多傳媒報導新彊問題時也是引用他的報告,似乎成了唯一參考資料,但是他往往在智庫發表研究,而不是在一定要經同僚審閱的學術期刊。曾茲的新彊研究有甚麼地方站不住腳,懂英語的讀者可以參閱:https://invisiblearmada.web.nctu.edu.tw/2021/01/21/the-last-day-of-pompeo-genocide-in-xinjiang/#_ftn7

[12] 譬如參見 : « Le député belge qui défie Pékin sur le sort des Ouïgours du Xinjiang - Simon Cogolati a déposé une proposition de loi accusant la Chine de génocide », par Jean-Pierre Stroobans, correspondant du Monde à Bruxelles (Le Monde du 24/04/2021)

[13] 我說「當下時代股東」是指那些依照買賣股票原則來在當下出沒的人,應該說他們佔領當下才對:時勢愈壞,金融市場就愈好,而他們買的「股票」也升得愈多。所以「維吾爾種族滅絕」這隻股票在瘟疫蹂躪全球的時期上市,就再好不過了。

[14] (譯註)「把中國圍堵,推回去原位」。圍堵、推回這兩項策略是美國在冷戰用來對付共產勢力的。

[15] (譯註)拉魯斯詞典是法語世界其中一本可靠詞典。

[16] (譯註)典出克勞塞維茲這位十九世紀普魯士軍事家的《論戰爭》名句:「打仗純粹就是用別的方法來繼續做政治」。

[17] (譯註)卓姆士奇,Noam Chomsky (1928- ),美國語言學家。

[18] 刊在二零二一年四月廿三號《紐約時報》。


25 June 2021

In a context of rampant war of the worlds, where the desires to cross swords are hidden less and less, words, certain words, tend to become weapons. In order to prepare them for this use, they should be subjected to reprocessing so that they become operational on the battlefield. The engineers and mercenaries of the new cold war are working it ardently and are rapidly acquiring expert knowledge in the field.

One of the key words in this new configuration, as we have already noted, is the term "genocide". But the issues that are condensed around it in the war of discourses that is taking shape, both political and philosophical, are of such importance that it is worth returning to them, every day feeding the chronicle of its redeployment – of the inflation of a rhetoric of genocide inspired by the fiercest of nihilisms.

On 22 April, a handful of members of the House of Commons (it has not been possible to establish precisely whether there were five or seven, certainly less than ten, out of 650 members of this august assembly) passed a motion, using a procedural device, describing the campaign of "re-education" of the Uighur population conducted in Xinjiang by the Chinese regime as genocide and crime against humanity.

This motion, devoid of any legislative value and not committing the British Government in any way, is therefore only an approximate publicity stunt undertaken by a quarter of activists relaying on other initiatives, in particular in the United States; it is intended, like so many others, to trivialize or even give legal force to the characterization of the campaign launched by the Chinese Government, accompanied by massive internments in the Xinjiang region, and other infinitely reprehensible practices, as genocide.

This is despite the fact that a few weeks earlier, the Legal Committee of the US State Department had issued an opinion that there was insufficient evidence to qualify the Chinese authorities' policy in Xinjiang as genocide, even though certain practices (forced labor) could be defined as crimes against humanity.

Described as a "farce" in the British press, this frivolous show by the core anti-Chinese lobby in the House of Commons became "breaking news", and on six columns, in Taipei Times two days later: “UK lawmakers call PRC's Uighur policies ‘genocide’” - a title in the form of blatant and deliberate distortion of the facts since it aims to make the reader believe that it was a majority of elected representatives in the House of Commons who adopted this motion. At no time is the ridiculously small number of Members who voted for the motion mentioned in the article. It's not just on crazy social media that fakes news thrives.

On the other hand - and this is where this crude propagandist operation becomes interesting - the article quotes one of the initiators of the motion, a certain Nus Ghani, a conservative MP, long engaged in the anti-Chinese campaign about the situation in Xinjiang and moreover "sanctioned" (declared undesirable) for this reason by the Chinese authorities; Nus Ghani, therefore, takes the opportunity to redefine, on her own authority, the notion of genocide and make it undergo a radical shift: "There is a misunderstanding that genocide is just one act – mass killing. That is false". Then, she adds that her criteria of genocide, the intention to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group are all obviously met in Xinjiang...

In other words, according to these candidates for the position of master of the language exercising their empire on dictionaries and textbooks of political science all around the world, the term "genocide" must be completely redeployed, displaced and extended. From now on, the intention to remove from the face of the earth a human group designated according to its race, its religious affiliation, or national becomes quite subsidiary. To this central notion of the purpose of eradicating, right down to the last, this group (which presupposes the intended and systematic implementation of its extermination), the British lobbyist substitutes the extremely flexible criterion which is condensed in the expression "to destroy in whole or in part", and which therefore aims to give substance to the equally plastic notion of "cultural genocide".

As a result of such a dilution of the concept of genocide, any minority group considering itself to be the victim of discriminatory measures by a state, any authority or another group will be able to say that it is the victim of a project or attempted “genocide” or "cultural genocide", destined to undermine its integrity, identity, its singularity, “in whole or in part”; discrimination affecting linguistic usages, religious practices, mores, become therefore putative or potential genocide: the strong discrimination that hits Muslims in France or India, it is the open door to genocide; the Catalans who consider themselves mistreated by the Spanish state, ditto. The Taiwanese aborigines whose languages and customs are in perpetual deficit of recognition, so!

And, conversely, when the ultras of Taiwanese independence speak of "disinizing" the island, it would, likewise, have a strong scent of genocide...

On this path, genocide becomes the all-inclusive of all those who, as a minority or ill-treated group, have a wrong to assert, against an abusive authority or a more powerful one. The concept loses all its original scope, at the same time as it is intended, in the ulterior motives of those who engage in this operation, to become an absolute weapon against the enemy of the moment – the Chinese regime, in this case.

When he coined this notion in 1944, Rafaël Lemkin had two main objectives: first, to produce the name of an unprecedented crime. If genocide is a word fabricated by combining a Greek root and another, Latin, it is not by chance: it is because it was necessary, in a certain state of emergency, to produce a term intended to designate and pin a mass crime (the racial exterminations perpetrated by the Nazis) of which it appeared, at this turning point in history, when Soviet troops liberated the Nazi extermination camps, that it was not comparable with any state crime of the past and that it was therefore not likely to be adequately designated by the existing nomenclature: bloodbath, carnage, massacre, hecatomb, pogrom, killing... even the word extermination appeared to remain below the crime, not reflecting either the intentionality of the crime (its programming and systematic implementation), or the designation of victims according to the criteria set by the racist, supremacist ideology of the criminal state.

Secondly, the production of the word genocide by Lemkin (a jurist) aims to create the conditions for a justice that stands up to the crimes that were committed by the Nazis. It is therefore necessary, in particular, to be able to rule on the imprescriptibility of some of these crimes and to waive, as far as they are concerned, the general principle of non-retroactivity of the application of laws.

It is therefore clear that the production of the term genocide as a legal and historical category, distinct from the concept of crime against humanity, has a quite specific function: to prevent the relativization of state crimes, historical crimes, committed during the twentieth century and whose singularity can be stated as follows: those who conceive, plan and carry out these crimes intend to remove from the common body of humanity a fraction of it, designated according to racial, ethnic, religious or national criteria, or even social. In their minds, it is a purification operation insofar as the perpetrators cannot coexist on this earth with this part of the human species that they intend to eradicate as completely as possible.

The notion of genocide aims to make conceivable this singularity of a purifying and erasing project implemented under general conditions of "modernity"; it is intended to make it possible, despite all the obstacles, to pull into the path of reparation for the harm suffered by the victims, in particular by preventing modern genocides from being dissolved in a general history of massacres, of historical violence — a formless, timeless, history, devoid of any concept. By definition, therefore, if genocide is to be a concept, if it is to retain its analytical edge, it is necessary, first and foremost, to oppose its dilution and its eclectic and opportunistic uses.

However, the rhetorical outbidding that the patented agitators are engaged in on the Uighur issue is heading in exactly the opposite direction. The strange and singular thing is that this banalizing and instrumental inclination is now giving free rein at a time when we have not yet really emerged and recovered particularly in Western Europe and North America, from another bias, just as damaging: the production of a kind of civil religion of the Holocaust (of the Shoah) whose proper is to be based on another rhetorical operation - the one that aims at making of the destruction of the Jews of Europe by the Nazis the essential Genocide, that is to make the Shoah (the Holocaust) the quintessence of genocide, the absolute and unique referent of genocide. An operation whose effect is to hinder the identification and recognition of other genocides (the Armenian genocide, for example) and to stir up competition among the victims - a spiral that begins as soon as the Shoah, as a European catastrophe, is set as the universal standard of genocide. This operation benefits from the fact that the very genesis of the concept coined by Lemkin is indissociable from this unprecedented criminal event – the “Final Solution” (Endlösung) to the “Jewish problem”, as the Nazi leaders imagined it.

It is not only that the term genocide was constantly drawn into the orbit of the Shoah, in such a massive and pressing way, that other scenes of genocide were under-exposed. It is also that, in the phase in which the discourse of absolute singularity and uniqueness (some going so far as to practice the outbidding of the "uniquely unique") of the Shoah reached its climax (the years 1990-2000), this discourse was clearly shifted in the direction of an ethic with a strong theological coloration whose characteristic was to be refractory to historical and political discussion and criticism (of its philosophical as well as ideological and political presuppositions).

But at the same time, it turned out that this discursive form and the mode of problematization of the singularity of the extermination of the Jews had a strong coloration of political theology - consisting essentially in immunizing the state of Israel against any criticism by making it, by association, a sacred object. According to this mode of enunciation of the singularity of genocide, it merges with the uniqueness (absolute exceptionality) of the Shoah and tends to make it a sacred object (of horror and terror). The state that proclaims itself the heir of the victims and presents itself as the one that repairs the harm inflicted on them becomes in its turn a sacred object and, as such, exempts itself from criticism and is suppose to immunize it against any suspicion of abuse of power (against the Palestinians, notably).

This was the meaning of the discursive operation that was arranged in the decades of the last century around the figure of genocide, focused on the Holocaust (the Shoah). What we are called upon to reflect on today is the huge gap that is growing, in terms of arrangement of the discourses that are called upon to set the tone of present time, between this posture and the one that is emerging today, with the redeployment of the issues condensed around this infinitely powerful and dense word - genocide.

Under the previous regime, the one that will be designated, to go to the essentials, as the Lanzmannian regime, the emphasis is placed on the unspeakable, the indescribable of a capital Crime that resists analysis and description and about which we can only testify - the survivors, direct witnesses and those who testify for the victims, silent witnesses[1]. The affect that accompanies this gesture is piety: memory tends to become indistinct from worship, any discussion around the Genocide as a historical fact is doomed to become an impiety, even an insanity that will be denounced with vehemence by the guardians of memory. But this fundamentalism of the memory of the incomparable Crime is suspect - it carries in its luggage all kinds of political unspoken. To put it bluntly, in the work of the filmmaker Claude Lanzmann his film to the glory of the Israeli army Tsahal hardly separates itself from the work that constitutes the keystone of the ethical discourse that is jointed with the theology of the Holocaust – the monumental Shoah...

What a contrast between the serious tones and the metaphysical accents, the philosophical intensities that supported this police of statements concerning the Genocide and the current discursive agitation around the question of Xinjiang! Here, it is no longer at all respected and sometimes revered philosophers (Lévinas, Blanchot, Ricoeur...) who set the tone but influencers financed by shady foundations, rogue political adventurers à la Pompeo, professionals of anti-Chinese agitation, journalists in uniform or in livery. At a time when the guardians of memory stood guard in front of the discourse of the Singularity, anyone who suggested that "things" could be said differently or tried to spot the flaws and blind spots of this police of statements was exposed to the risk of being overwhelmed with infamous epithets intended to banish him from discussion[2]. This is because the Evil with which he was immediately suspected of making a pact was then written with a giant capital letter...

The agitation around the "Uighur genocide", by contrast, does not bother with this heavy metaphysical equipment, it travels light and goes straight to the point: to find the defect of the armor by which could penetrate the poisoned line likely to make the Chinese power falter. In simple terms, it will be said that, in the context of the endless war of the worlds, the lesson-giving West has recently been inflicted by China such a masterful thrashing (in terms of biopolitical efficiency) by China, on the occasion of the Covid 19 pandemic, that it has become urgent and vital for its multiple agencies to organize diversions intended to put back in the saddle the discourse of values and lights of which it would be and will remain the spokesman from his manifest destiny. This is, first and foremost, the vocation and function of the current frantic agitation around the Uighur genocide. Once again, the dissecting of this discursive operation (or ideological campaign, as was said in the time of St. Marx) does not in any way amount to or aim to evade the "problem" that constitutes, in the present, the policy conducted by the Chinese leaders and administration in Xinjiang; it is all but saying: 'move around, there is nothing to see!' There is something to be seen, but this something must be named and denounced under the ordinary conditions of an analytical, critical, genealogical approach - not of this new nihilistic obscurantism, driven by the passion for chaos and supported by the obscure desire for the collapse of the Chinese regime, with all its foreseeable consequences.

What we do see is a campaign of forced assimilation, of neo-colonial style and spirit, a campaign of acculturation that undermines the most intimate of people's lives, in its cultural and religious foundations. One of these "great campaigns" inspired by a brutal, simplistic and hasty "planist" conception of political and governmental action. As such, the campaign underway in Xinjiang would be comparable to that which, during the Cultural Revolution, consisted of sending millions of urban young people, students and high school students in particular, to the countryside. This, even at the time, for the purposes of "re-education", bringing into line and putting to work a youth destined to be ideologically formatted and disciplined to excess. It is the lead hand of a power with a brain made foggy (today) by the vertigo of success and totally inept in its treatment of an issue where the dispute, now become global, around Islam is at stake (and the return of colonial and post-colonial issues of all kinds, not to mention the neo-colonial postures of the West in the context of its present “moral rearmament”).

But to equate this problem (serious, and not close to being settled, with the way things are going and given the way in which the Chinese state bureaucracy handles the bear pavement) with the Soviet Great Terror or the Nazi exterminations, by decree, without references and without argumentation, equipped with the only reference to the Orwellian catch-all 1984 - this is pure nihilism, in the tone of the today's obscurantism.

This is, of course, what is opening the doors of the academic career wide to a generation of ambitious and newly graduated opportunists who have for all academic capital only their irrational hatred of China; young people whose thought leaders are Mike Pompeo and Adrian Zenz, who know nothing of the classical literature on the Soviet and Nazi concentration camp systems; and who, blindly confident in the performative function of propaganda and repetition, have no doubt that by dint of saying that genocide is taking place in Xinjiang and that it is of the same kind as what is commonly subsumed under the names of Auschwitz and Gulag - this mantra will turn into a stainless factual truth; fresh cold war doctors - just as we find everywhere in western countries those third-rate politicians who now specialize in anti-Chinese activism and whose ardent hope is that the Chinese watchdogs take notice of them and make them famous by the same token.

What is striking, when we reflect on the condition of the discourses and the police of the statements in their relation to the fundamental political questions, with the problems of the balance of power, is this: the very close combination between two modalities which, however, should exclude each other; on the one hand, this general rule: what could be called vital statements, those that, in a given configuration, cut out the territory of the true - what presents itself and asserts itself under the regime of the indisputable, immune to criticism. In this regard, to lend, in the past, the flank to the accusation of wanting to "relativize the Shoah", it was the worst thing that could have happened to you in the discursive topography where prevailed the motive of the Uniqueness (the absolute singularity) of the Shoah; the consequence being this intolerant and dogmatic trend of the basic statements that prevail in this configuration.

And then, on the other hand, what clashes head-on with all the presumptions attached to this apodictical modality: a regime of perfect discontinuity – they (the “Uighur genocide” lobby) turn the pages, even they tear them apart and we move on to a new chapter, they just forget, if necessary they erase the traces, but more generally, not even: they move on to something else with a light heart, carelessly. The Genocide had become the vector of an ethical and theological turning point in political philosophy; here it is redeployed, hastily repainted as a "cultural genocide" (but more often than not, they shorten it into genocide anyway), perpetrated by the Chinese totalitarian power, and this time, it is a motley coalition of politicians, journalists and formatted young academics that sticks to it. The logocrats of the present time are moving on to the agenda, always on the breach: today, the priority is to contain and roll back the Chinese power, by all means, fire on the Headquarters! - while Ethics and Emmanuel Levinas' sacred texts are purely and simply rejected to the background.

The notion of genocide has always been exposed to instrumentalization, it goes without saying, but, with the indifference displayed in its elementary sense (genocide: “systematic extermination of a human, national, ethical or religious group" – Larousse dictionary, 2006), a new level has been reached. Unfortunately, those who practice this outbidding of infecting words into political utensils and weapons of war are here in good company: when, on 24 April, Joe Biden officially recognized the Armenian genocide in the name of the United States, it was not the love of the truth or the ardent desire to pay tribute to the victims that inspired him; much more trivially and sinisterly, it was mainly a question of punishing Turkey and its leader Erdogan for certain recent changes in the foreign and military policy of this country, which the United States does not find to its liking.

It is very difficult to imagine anything gloomier than this use of genocide, in the service of the continuation of politics or war... "by other means" (to parody a famous formula).

In a recent interview with a New York Times reporter, Noam Chomsky said: “ Let’s take what’s happening with the Uyghur. Pretty hard to get good evidence, but there’s enough evidence to show that there’s very severe repression going on. Let me ask you a simple question. Is the situation of the Uyghurs, a million people who’ve been through education camps, is that worse than the situation of, say, two million and twice that many people in Gaza? I mean, are the Uyghur having their power plants destroyed, their sewage plants destroyed, subjected to regular bombing? Is it not happening to them? Not to my knowledge. So yes, it shouldn’t be happening. We should protest it. It has one crucial difference from Gaza. Namely, in the Uyghur case, there’s not a lot that we can do about it, unfortunately. In the Gaza case, we can do everything about it since we were responsible for it, we can stop it tomorrow. That’s the difference. OK? So yes, that’s a very bad thing among other bad things in the world. But to say that it’s a threat to us is a little misleading.”[3].

This, addressed to the American public in the first place, is not badly said at all...

[1] Claude Lanzmann (1925-2018) was a French filmaker, writer and polemist. His film Shoah was the matrix of the notion of the Holocaust as the Absolute crime.

[2] I'm not talking here of the repugnant revisionist ( « negationnist ») sect which, notably in France, launched a campaign on the motto « Gas chambers have never existed ». The radical nihilism that inspired this agitation rightfully resulted in the banishment of there people from the field of public discussion on the subject.

[3] New York Times, 23/04/ 2021. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/23/podcasts/ezra-klein-podcast-noam-chomsky-transcript.html